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Abstract
 
The accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the European
Union (EU) is expected to lead to the new member countries becoming more like
the older members, including in terms of trade. In this paper, we focus on two
factors promoting CEE–EU trade integration: trade liberalization and institutional
reforms. Measures of trade liberalization undertaken by both parties during the
1990s were very substantial, but did not always produce the expected upsurge of
regional trade flows. Much less progress has been made in improving the func-
tioning of CEE institutions (e.g., progress in the privatization process or in reducing
corruption). Countries where most important changes at the institutional level
occurred were also those that most increased their trade with the EU. Comparing
the impact of these two factors, we find that improving institutions in CEE coun-
tries can generate as much trade as the removal of all tariff and non-tariff barriers.
The paper also addresses the issue of the presence of reversed causality between
trade and institutions, and the pro-trade effect of institutional similarity.
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1. Introduction
 
East–West European trade integration started with the reduction of tariffs on bilat-
eral imports, which generated an important increase in regional trade. However,
even after most policy barriers have been eliminated, the potential for further
expansion of trade remains large. This suggests that the reduction of other types
of impediments to European trade is possible. It confirms at the same time the
existence of complementary determinants of trade, less explored in the literature,
but no less important in shaping trade patterns. Another factor was subject to
important changes during the same time period: institutions in transition countries.
The abandoning of the centralized system by these countries, and their increasing
willingness to join the EU motivated their governments to undertake large reforms
in this area. Institutional reforms were a chief condition imposed by the EU on new
candidate countries. In order to permit the good functioning of the enlarged union,
candidate states were required to adopt changes in their legislation, increase the
efficiency of the judicial system, reduce corruption, and so on. However, unlike in
the case of trade policy, progress made by different countries in this direction was
more moderate, and varied significantly across countries. The present paper
explores the institutional heterogeneity and regional trade liberalization in Europe,
and develops specific recommendations in terms of economic policy for further
trade integration.
The focus on institutions is well established in some areas of economics, such
as the new institutional economics (Coase, 1937; North, 1990; Williamson, 2000),
and growth and development economics (Acemoglu 
 
et al
 
., 2001; Rodrik 
 
et al
 
., 2002;
Kaufmann 
 
et al.
 
, 2003). However, only very recently have institutions captured the
interest of international trade economists. Institutions are generally defined as
formal and informal rules of behaviour, means for ensuring their application,
mediation procedures in case of dispute, sanctions for violation of established
rules, and organizations and bodies charged with their enforcement. The quality of
institutions is judged as more or less good according to the more or less good
functioning of their different elements. Examples include constitutions, judicial
systems, banks, corporate and bankruptcy laws, tax collection and competition
agencies. Effective institutions are those which ensure that the incentives they create
actually lead to the desired behaviour.
Recent work by Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), de Groot 
 
et al
 
. (2004), Jansen
and Nordas (2004), Koukhartchouk and Maurel (2003), and Duc 
 
et al
 
. (2005)
illustrate the pro-trade effect of institutions. However, this literature disregards
the possibility of institutions being affected by a country’s participation in inter-
national trade. Inspired by the research in economic development, the present
paper studies the endogeneity between trade and institutions. We use a mono-
polistic competition model of trade to analyse the relationship between trade and
the quality of domestic and foreign institutions for 25 European countries. Better
institutions at home and abroad increase the security of international exchange,
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reduce uncertainty and contract enforcement costs, and thereby persuade firms to
trade more. Conversely, increased participation in international transactions
generates more demand for institutional reforms, and puts higher pressure on
the government to finance and execute them. Trade is, thus, a channel through
which a country’s economic agents can learn new ways to ameliorate existing
institutions. Although the existing literature establishes that fragmentation of
institutions at country level is an additional source of transaction costs, a specific
variable measuring institutional heterogeneity is missing. In this paper, we
introduce the concept of 
 
institutional distance
 
 to fill this gap. Even in the case
of well-functioning institutions, the existence of country-specific procedures and
practices introduces confusion and supplementary costs. Therefore, similarity
between institutional frameworks in the exporting and importing countries, along
with the development of high-quality national institutions, has a trade creating
effect.
The effect of institutional reforms on trade is compared to that of foreign
trade policy. We compute the share of each factor in total border-specific trade
costs, and find strong national institutions to be no less important for promoting
European trade than the removal of policy barriers. A further increase of regional
trade is, therefore, likely to occur even after all tariff and non-tariff barriers
have been eliminated. The separation of institutions into general, and specific
to transition countries, and the employment of quantitative variables allow one
to formulate specific recommendations to governments in terms of economic
policy.
Section 2 discusses in detail CEE–EU trade liberalization and institutional
reforms undertaken by CEE countries. Sections 3 and 4, present the trade model,
and the data employed. Baseline results are shown in Section 5. Endogeneity
issues, the pro-trade effect of trade liberalization and institutional reforms are
considered in Sections 6 and 7. In Section 8 we distinguish between general
development (GD) and market transition (MT) institutions, and Section 9 summarizes
the conclusions.
 
2. European trade liberalization and institutional changes
 
In the early 1990s all transition countries engaged in a strong process of trade
liberalization with the EU. Despite the fact that timetables and specific measures
differed from country to country, by the beginning of the twenty-first century each
country’s trade with the EU was characterized as almost entirely free. However,
annual growth rates of CEE–EU bilateral trade are far from being uniform. One can
easily see from Figure 1 that the major increase in CEE–EU bilateral trade occurred
in the mid-1990s. Meanwhile, the majority of regional trade liberalization measures
became effective after 1995, and can be held responsible only for the later growth
of the bilateral trade. In the light of research on trade potential, the important early
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boom in the foreign trade of transition countries can be associated with their
re-integration into the world economic system.
 
2
 
Still, not all the growth of the trade of transition countries with the EU, even
after 1995, can be imputed to regional trade liberalization. For instance, the highest
growth rates of the exports of transition countries to their EU partners do not
always correspond to the lowest values of the average EU import tariff (Table 1).
Clearly, other factors are at work. The present paper focuses on the importance of
 
2
 
 See Wang and Winters (1991), Baldwin (1993), Hamilton and Winters (1992), Harrigan (2003), Gros and
Gonciarz (1996), Fontagné, Freudenberg and Pajot (1999) for a further discussion.
Figure 1. Annual growth rates of CEE–EU trade
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one such determinant – national institutions – both 
 
per se
 
, and relative to foreign
trade policy. Institutions have been shown to be strong determinants of economic
growth.
 
3
 
 The literature on economic development points also to reversed causality
between per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth and the quality of insti-
tutions. Strong domestic institutions are an important precondition for economic
growth, but are simultaneously shaped by the level of economic development of
the country.
The examination of national-level institutions in connection with international
trade is very recent in the literature. The pioneer paper on this subject is Anderson
and Marcouiller (2002). It investigates the impact of corruption and imperfect con-
tract enforcement on international trade patterns, and concludes that inadequate
institutions constrain trade as much as the tariffs. Later work by Koukartchouk and
Maurel (2003), de Groot 
 
et al
 
. (2004), and Jansen and Nordas (2004) confirms this
finding. Despite the different institutional aspects considered in these papers, they
all rely on index measures for the quality of institutions. Turrini and Ypersele (2002),
 
3
 
 See Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002), Frankel and Romer (1999), Warner and Sachs (1995).
Table 1. Export growth, trade liberalization, and quality of institutions in CEE
Country Manufactured 
exports to EU, 
1993–2000 
growth rate (%)
Change in 
average 
EU tariff, 
1993–2000a
IEF score, 
2000b
EBRD 
score, 
2000b
Kaufmann 
score, 
2000b
Fraser 
score, 
2000b
Estonia 647 −2.75 0.67 0.62 0.68 0.68
Lithuania 364 −2.75 0.47 0.54 0.59 0.61
Slovakia 323 −4.25 0.50 0.55 0.59 0.54
Hungary 288 −6.17 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.63
Romania 242 −2.58 0.39 0.46 0.46 0.43
Czech Republic 230 −6.17 0.67 0.61 0.64 0.67
Latvia 199 −2.75 0.57 0.52 0.58 0.65
Bulgaria 153 −2.58 0.42 0.50 0.52 0.50
Poland 149 −6.14 0.53 0.62 0.64 0.52
Slovenia 51 −4.42 0.50 0.56 0.68 0.57
Notes: aChange in percentage points between the first and the last year of the period for which data are
available.
bA value closer to 1 corresponds to an increased level of a country’s economic freedom, a better functioning
of market institutions, or a better governance.
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de Groot 
 
et al
 
. (2004), and Duc 
 
et al
 
. (2005) analyse the effect of similarity of the
quality of governance, but without constructing a separate variable for institutional
homogeneity. The possible endogeneity between trade and institutions is ignored
in all of the above studies.
The present paper complements this literature in several ways. First, we
consider two types of institutions: 
 
general development
 
 (GD) institutions, and
institutions specific to 
 
market transition
 
 (MT) of CEE economies. We also call the
latter 
 
market institutions
 
, as they reflect the development of functional market
economies in these countries. Secondly, two distinct ways in which institutions
affect trade are identified. Trade increases not only when it is supported by strong
institutions in the importing and exporting countries, but also when the differences
in the institutions between the two are small. Hence, countries with poor but similar
institutions exchange more, because they have already acquired the experience by
trading locally and by overcoming difficulties of the poor institutional environ-
ment. When other things are equal, engaging in transactions with partners from
countries with similar institutional deficiencies means a lower burden.
Next, through the use of appropriate instrumental variables, we examine the
reverse causality between trade and institutions. The quality of institutions can be
influenced by the extent to which the country participates in international trade. A
high openness to foreign trade intensifies the demand for better institutions, which
can increase a government’s willingness to improve existent institutions. Alterna-
tively, trade 
 
per se
 
 can generate positive externalities, including the effect of learn-
ing about better institutions that exist abroad. Combining these arguments with
findings in the literature on economic growth, we conclude that institutions shape
both international trade and per capita GDP growth, yet remain sensitive to
changes in either of the two. The present paper discusses only causality between
trade and national institutions. Other mutual dependencies are explored in depth
in the economic growth literature.
Central and Eastern Europe is a region where very significant institutional
changes took place during the 1990s. The passage from a planned to a market-
oriented economy induced major reforms in domestic institutions, although they
were uneven across the region. Hence, the impact of institutional changes on trade
is even more significant in the case of transition countries. Table 1 displays the
scores of four institutional measures for CEE countries in the year 2000. The Index
of Economic Freedom (IEF) of the Heritage Foundation shows the level of
economic freedom within a country, and can be viewed as a measure of the quality of
GD institutions. The composite index of the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) reflects the advance of the transition process, that is, of
reforms meant to ensure the passage to the market economy. For comparability,
the last two columns show the corresponding institutional scores, computed by
Kaufmann 
 
et al
 
. (2003), and by the Fraser Institute. Original scores have been re-
scaled in order to take values in the interval [0; 1]. A score closer to 1 corresponds
to a higher level of the economic freedom in the country, better functioning of
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market institutions, or improved governance. Countries are ranked according to
the growth rate of their exports to EU partners during the 1990s. By the beginning
of the twenty-first century, EU tariffs on imports from CEE countries were almost
completely eliminated. Table 1 shows that countries with higher institutional
scores performed better in terms of exports to the EU. The largest increase in
exports to the EU is found for countries with the best IEF score. One can conclude,
therefore, that at least some part of the uneven CEE–EU trade growth displayed in
Figure 1, comes from differences in national institutions. We think this is sufficient
motivation for more serious investigation of causality between trade, institutions,
and trade policy, which we undertake in the following sections.
 
3. The trade model
 
We build a trade model in which bilateral trade is affected by countries’ economic
environments. We apply the hypothesis of Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) that
insecurity constrains trade by raising the price of goods, in a monopolistic compe-
tition setting, with firm level product differentiation as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
and Krugman (1980). As in Anderson and Young (2002), and Anderson and Marcouiller
(2002), imperfect contract enforcement is reflected in a price mark-up equivalent to
a hidden tax on trade. But unlike their case, our hidden transaction costs, associated
with the insecurity of international trade, arise from poor institutions in both the
importer’s and the exporter’s country. Moreover, the national character of these
institutions is an additional source of fragmentation of the economic space, and
constitutes by itself a barrier to cross-border exchange. Hence, we account for the
role of both domestic and foreign institutions, as well as for their similarity.
Consumers in each country solve a two-step budgeting function. First, consumers
determine the proportion of total expenditure 
 
E
 
j
 
 to allocate to internationally
traded goods, both foreign and domestic:
(1)
where 
 
x
 
ij
 
 is the amount of goods that country 
 
j
 
 buys from the producers of
country 
 
i
 
, 
 
p
 
ij
 
 is the price of these goods, and the product 
 
m
 
ij
 
 
 
=
 
 x
 
ij
 
p
 
ij
 
 gives the value
of country 
 
j
 
’s imports from 
 
i.
 
 Secondly, the value of 
 
E
 
j
 
 is distributed across con-
sumed varieties. We assume that products are differentiated at firm level, that
consumer preferences are homothetic, of CES form, and identical across countries
and varieties. The utility of a representative consumer from the importing country
 
j
 
 is then given by
(2)
E x p mj ij ij
i
ij
i
    = =∑ ∑
u xj ijr
r
n
i
i
i
i
   =
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
−
=
−
∑∑ σσ
σ
σ
1
1
1
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where 
 
n
 
i
 
 represents the number of varieties produced and exported by country 
 
i
 
,
and at the same time, the number of firms in country 
 
i
 
, because each variety is
produced by a separate firm.
The demand in country 
 
j
 
 for goods produced in 
 
i
 
 is obtained by solving the
optimization problem, in which importing country consumers maximize their utility
(2) subject to the budget constraint (1):
(3)
The denominator in Equation (3) is an importer-specific non-linear price index,
representing the average price of internationally traded varieties to consumers
from country 
 
j
 
:
(4)
A tractable trade equation is obtained by dividing the bilateral imports 
 
m
 
ij
 
,
expressed by (3), by the imports of the same country from a different partner. We
choose a country’s trade with itself as reference for purchases from all foreign
partners, in order to relate our model to the literature on border effects. Non-linear
price indices 
 
P
 
j
 
, and the importer’s expenditure on internationally traded goods 
 
E
 
j
 
simplify to give the following equation of relative demands:
(5)
A confirmed finding in the recent literature is that countries trade significantly
less with each other than the theory predicts (Trefler, 1995; McCallum, 1995). The
difference is particularly strong when compared to trade within national borders,
revealing a so-called border effect. Trade policy barriers and the quality of institu-
tions are stated among the various explanations for this result. One way to evaluate
the role these two factors play in economic integration is to compare their contri-
bution in explaining the lower than expected trade volumes. Working with foreign-
to-domestic trade ratios, as in Equation (5), is very convenient for the estimation of
border effects.
A single production factor, labour, is used to produce all varieties. All countries
are assumed to have identical fixed and variable costs in terms of labour units: F and
µ respectively.
m n
p
P
Eij i
ij
j
j   .=
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
−1 σ
P n pj k kj
k
  .
/( )
=
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟−
−
∑ 1
1 1
σ
σ
m
m
n
n
p
p
ij
jj
i
j
ij
jj
   .=
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
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−1 σ
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In a monopolistic competition setup, producers face a constant price elasticity
of demand, equal to the elasticity of substitution between varieties, σ, and maximize
profits by setting the marginal cost equal to the marginal revenue:
(6)
Consequently, the unitary price of each variety can be expressed as a function
of the number of labour units, µ, used to produce it, of the unitary remuneration
of labour force wi, and of the elasticity of demand σ.
The market equilibrium with free entry of firms arises under average cost pricing,
since new firms enter the market until all profits vanish:
(7)
One can express the factory price, pi, from Equation (6), and substitute it in the
left hand side of Equation (7). Note, that the price of any variety produced in
country i is a linear function of country’s wage, wi. Wage on both sides of the
equation simplifies, and the number of units of variety i produced at equilibrium
becomes a function of invariable amounts, F, µ, and σ:
(8)
With symmetric varieties, equal quantities q ≡ [F(σ – 1)]/µ of each variety are
produced. The output, yi, of country i equals the sum of outputs of its firms,
evaluated at producer prices, pi:
yi = niqpi. (9)
We also allow prices at destination pij to differ from country to country propor-
tionally to bilateral trade costs, τij:
pij = piτij. (10)
It is thus implicitly assumed that all partners are charged the same factory price.
Expressing ni from (9), and pi from (6), and substituting expression (10) in trade
Equation (5), one gets the following expression of relative demands:
µw pi i  
  
.=
−
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
σ
σ
1
µ µ µp Fw
q
w w
F
qi
i
i
i i
i
        .= + = +
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
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q
F
i   
(   )
.=
−σ
µ
1
220 Cheptea
© 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(11)
Next, we consider the structure of trade costs, τij. The price of a good consumed
in the importing country j exceeds the producer price by the transport cost, the
import tariff, the tariff equivalent of non-tariff barriers, and an ‘insecurity’ mark-
up. The latter represents hidden transaction costs associated with the non-existence
or the poor functioning of national institutions (as defined in Section 2). Anderson
and Marcouiller (2002) show that the magnitude of this insecurity mark-up
depends on the quality of national institutions.4
The fulfilment of a cross-border transaction involves a set of procedures to be
accomplished in the exporting and importing country. The search for a foreign
partner, the negotiation of the trade contract, the shipment of goods across the
border, clearing the customs, and the international payment imply a direct interaction
with institutions of both countries. Therefore, the complexity of these operations,
the associated costs and delays, as well as the success of the entire transaction,
will be affected by the quality of domestic and foreign institutions.
Three sources of trade costs are identified here: transport costs, trade policy
costs (both tariffs and non-tariff barriers), and institutional costs:
(12)
Transport costs are instrumented by the distance. The ad valorem import tariff,
tij, generates a linear increase of total trade costs, and raises the price precisely in
proportion to the tariff. Non-tariff barriers (NTB) have a similar effect, but are
considerably more difficult to measure. We use the NTB trade coverage and frequency
ratios to quantify the level of these barriers, denoted by ntbij in Equation (12).
Variables Si and Sj reflect the quality of institutions in countries i and j respec-
tively. As better institutions facilitate trade and reduce additional transaction costs,
we expect coefficients γ 1 and γ 2 to be negative.5 As shown by de Groot et al. (2004),
it is not only the quality of institutions in the trading countries that matters for bilateral
trade, but also the institutional similarity or homogeneity. We account for this
aspect by introducing a variable institutional distance, the inverse of institutional
similarity, in the structure of trade costs (12). Partners from countries with similar
institutions are more familiar with each other’s formal procedures, conventions,
4 Institutions for the defence of trade, and factors that allow traders to use those institutions successfully,
are considered by Anderson and Marcouiller (2002).
5 Notice that Si and Sj need not contain the same elements. It is possible, and even very likely, that different
things promote (impede) trade in the origin and the destination country. However, this aspect cannot be
investigated with the trade specification developed by this model.
m
m
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norms of behaviour, and even business practices. When engaging in bilateral trade
transactions, they also face reduced adjustment costs, and lower insecurity, relative
to the natural unfamiliarity of the international environment. Similarity of informal
business procedures may increase bilateral trust, and institutional similarity
increases the compatibility of trading partners, which could explain a fair amount
of the border effect. In our specific case, this suggests a positive weight, γ3, of the
absolute difference between the qualities of institutions of the two countries.
There may be complementary cross-border costs, bij, other than the ones
described above. While we are unable to identify their source, we can still quantify
them, by introducing a factor that takes for international transactions values
greater than 1 in Equation (12). The variable homeij is a dummy that denotes
whether trading partners are from the same country, and (exp(bij) − 1) × 100 is the
tariff equivalent of border-specific trade barriers on country i exports to j, different
from tariffs, NTB, and institutions.
In contrast to the trade costs specification given by (12), the literature on border
effects divides trade costs into two broad categories: those corresponding to costs
common to all flows, continuous across space, and those standing for border-
specific costs, that occur only when traded goods cross international borders. Repre-
sentative for the first category are transport costs, which arise for both international
and domestic transactions. The presence of border-specific costs, such as tariffs and
different institutional environments, generates discontinuous shifts in trade costs
and flows. Therefore, tariff and non-tariff barriers, and the non-uniformity of
national institutions account at least for a partial explanation of border effects. The
quality of institutions, however, matters for all trade flows, foreign and domestic,
and refers to the first type of trade costs. For internal shipments, the second, the
third, and the last two factors of the right hand side of Equation (12) disappear.
Domestic trade costs are given by:
(13)
Note, that if institutions matter for domestic trade as much as they do for
foreign trade flows, then the following identity should hold: γ 4 = γ 1 + γ 2. Different
functional forms for internal and cross-border trade costs, with respect to the quality
of an institution, may be an additional source of lower than expected international
trade. However, in the absence of supporting evidence, this aspect is considered
only partially in Sections 7 and 8.
Substituting Equations (12) and (13) into the relative demand Equation (11), and
taking log, we get:
(14)
τ γρjj jj jd S  exp( ).= 4
ln   ln    ln   (   ) ln   (   ) ln(   )
               (   )   (   )(   )  (   )    
m
m
y
y
w
w
d
d
t
ntb S S S S
ij
jj
i
j
i
j
ij
jj
ij
ij i j i j
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There are two institutional terms on the right hand side of Equation (14). The
difference in the quality of national institutions of the exporting and importing
country (Si − Sj) reflects the impact of institutions of the exporting country on cross-
border, relative to domestic, trade. The absolute difference | Si − Sj | shows how the
dissimilarity between institutional environments of the trading countries affects the
trade between them. A positive coefficient for the former variable testifies that
improved national institutions increase trade, while an estimated negative coeffi-
cient for the latter reveals the positive role of institutional homogeneity. Note, that
the two measures can be highly correlated, which may produce biased and non-
significant estimates of the corresponding coefficients. Even if the estimation of the
true effects on trade of each of the two institutional measures is not possible due
to the presence of multicollinearity, one can still judge which of the two measures
is more important. In this case, dropping one of the two variables from Equation (14),
one can identify the main channel through which institutions shape trade flows.
The sign of the estimated coefficient on the left institutional variable will indicate the
prevalence of the quality of institutions, or of the institutional similarity.
To compare the explanatory power of changes in foreign trade policy with that
of changes in the institutional environment, we estimate the total border effect
between trading countries i and j, the residual border effect unexplained by tariffs
and NTB, and the residual border effect unexplained by the institutional variables.
The total effect reflects the loss in trade caused by all cross-border barriers, and is
obtained as the exponential of the constant of the model, when all border-specific
costs in (12) are replaced by a single term, exp((1 – homeij)Bij):
(15)
Now we can introduce the trade policy variables ln(1 + tij) and bntij in Equation
(15). The exponential of the resulting constant term gives the corresponding residual
border effect, that is, the drop in trade produced by all border-specific trade barriers
except tariffs and NTB. Similarly, one can estimate the residual border effect with
institutional variables. The computation of the increment in trade, induced sepa-
rately by trade liberalization and by institutional reforms, is then straightforward.
In the empirical part of the paper we focus on the coefficients of the tariffs, of
NTB, and of the institutional variables, as features of the economic environment of
the trading countries. In our model both factors have an impact on trade through
trade costs. Trade liberalization, and an improved functioning of national institu-
tions reduce transaction costs, and yield lower prices of exchanged goods charged
to consumers. Institutional reforms may have an even stronger effect on trade
as they also increase the homogeneity of the institutional environment: better
institutions are at work in all countries. We assume full similarity when trading
partners are from the same country.
ln   ln    ln   (   ) ln   (   )(   )  (   ) .
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However, working with relative demands, mij/mjj, implies the knowledge of
both foreign and internal trade values. Unlike the case of international trade, only
very few countries provide data on true trade flows taking place inside national
borders. To overcome this limitation, one can follow Wei (1996), and compute
internal trade as the difference between a country’s production and its exports to
all partners. This approach, however, yields biased results for at least two reasons.
First, it does not permit controlling for non-tradable goods, and thus inflates internal
trade and border effects. Secondly, it can produce negative values of internal
trade for large levels of re-exports.
A possible way to tackle this problem is to use a different dependent variable.
Rather than taking the foreign-to-domestic trade ratio, we can divide the exports
of country i to j by the exports of a reference country k to the same importing
country j:
(16)
In this way only international trade data are employed. Due to the specific form
of the dependent variable, the quality of institutions of the importing country, j,
drops out from Equation (16). The difference between the quality of national
institutions in the exporting and the reference country accounts for the role of
well- or mal-functioning national institutions in generating trade, but institutional
heterogeneity is displayed then by a more complex term than in (14). The two
institutional dimensions considered are better separated under the trade specification
(16), reducing the risk of multicollinearity. Although in this case one can no longer
estimate the border effects, the importance of reforms of institutions relative to
trade liberalization, as factors stimulating trade, can be judged, comparing the
trade creation effects of total trade liberalization, and of completed institutional
reforms. Note, that comparing absolute values of coefficients of the relevant variables
is misleading, as they are directly dependent on the units used.
Thus, we employ trade specification (14) to quantify the relative importance of
trade liberalization and of institutional reforms (the two strategies that countries
can adopt to intensify mutual trade), and (16) to differentiate between the impact
of the quality of institutions and that of the institutional diversity.
4. The data
In this paper, we use data on the bilateral trade between 24 countries of the now
enlarged EU: the 15 states who were members of the EU on 1 January 2004, 8 of the 10
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who joined the Union in May 2004 (not Cyprus and Malta), and the 2 countries of
the latest accession (Romania and Bulgaria).6 Throughout the paper I call the first
15 members EU countries, and the 10 Central and East European countries – CEE
or transition countries. I focus on the time period 1993 to 2000, when these countries
undertook important measures of trade liberalization, and reforms of their national
institutions. The almost complete liberalization of trade between EU and CEE
countries at the end of the studied period was accompanied by a significant
intensification of regional CEE trade. The passage of transition countries from a
centrally planned system to a market economy called for radical transformations
of the institutions, the elimination of some structures, and the establishment of new
ones. Even though the reform of the institutions is vital for the transition process,
it did, and continues to face, strong political and social opposition in many CEE
countries. Hence, it is more difficult to implement institutional reforms than to
eradicate regional tariffs and NTB. Meanwhile, the national institutions of the EU
countries changed very little. In the empirical part of the paper, we explore this
variation in the trade policy and the institutional environment of the sample (see
Appendix A).
The data on bilateral manufactured trade mij are obtained from the COMTRADE
(World Bank) database. Domestic trade, mjj, that is, imports of a country from itself,
is computed following Wei (1996), as the difference between domestic production
and the sum of exports to all foreign partners. The ratios mij/mjj, and mij/mkj are
calculated by dividing bilateral imports by the value of domestic trade and by the
value of imports from Germany, the reference country, respectively. Production
and wage data come from the World Bank–UNIDO database ‘Trade and Produc-
tion’. Missing data have been completed using the STAN database of OCDE for
production, and the ‘NewCronos’ database of Eurostat for wages.
To avoid the identification of a country with its capital (or largest) city, inter-
national distances are computed as the population-weighted average of inter-
regional distances. Each country is divided into comparable territorial units
corresponding to the EU’s NUTS II regions. The distance between two regions is
simply the distance between largest cities. Internal distances djj are computed
following the same principle in order to ensure comparability of the two measures:
as the population-weighted average distance from each region to all regions of the
country, including itself.7 In the case of small countries, with only 1 NUTS II region,
we use the breakdown into NUTS III regions. The distance of a region from itself, what
we call intra-regional distance, is computed as by Head and Mayer (2000): namely
two-thirds of the radius of a circle equal in area to the region. This is equivalent to
the average distance between local producers and consumers, when each region is
6 Belgium and Luxembourg are aggregated into a single observation.
7 Helliwell and Verdier (2001), and Head and Mayer (2000) show the importance of the internal geography
of trading countries in shaping trade flows.
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identified with a circle of an equal area, where producers are concentrated in the
centre, and consumers are equally spread in the entire region.
Tariffs, and NTB coverage and frequency ratios are calculated using Haveman’s
database, constructed originally from the TRAINS database of UNCTAD. There are
no tariff declarations for imports of Bulgaria and Slovakia. In Haveman’s database,
tariffs are reported at a very detailed level (the six-digit HS classification). We
aggregate the tariff and NTB data across manufactured products to match the data
on production, wages, and trade, using the value of the global imports as weights.
This choice is motivated by the fact that the only other data available, for the level
of disaggregation of tariffs and NTB, are the data on trade flows. We minimize the
endogeneity bias, due to the correlation between trade and tariffs, by weighting the
import tariffs of each country by world imports. Alternatively, Bouët et al. (2001)
use as weights the imports of a group of countries with a large share in global
trade. The NTB coverage ratio is computed as the volume of trade subject to at
least one non-tariff measure, and is expressed as a percentage of total bilateral
trade. The NTB frequency ratio is obtained by dividing the number of bilateral
non-tariff measures by the total number of tariff lines. By construction, both NTB
coverage and NTB frequency take values between 0 and 1. Small values of NTB
coverage and frequency ratios mean that non-tariff restrictions apply either to a
smaller part of bilateral imports, or to a smaller number of traded products, and
only zeros testify to the absence of any NTB for a given pair of countries.
We consider five sources of institutional variables: indices computed by the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), by the Heritage
Foundation, by the Fraser Institute, by Kaufmann et al. (1999) and Kaufmann et al.
(2003), and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). The first four
are used as measures of the quality of national institutions, and the last quantify
different aspects of the institutional framework.
The main results in this article are obtained with the EBRD and Heritage Foun-
dation indices. The EBRD evaluates the status quo of the institutional environment
of CEE countries, and the progress achieved by them in the transition process. We
employ nine distinct measures of the quality of countries’ institutions, published
by the EBRD on an annual basis, separately and aggregated as a single index
computed as their arithmetic mean.8 These indices take values from 1 to 4, with a
higher score indicating fuller or better implemented reforms. The EBRD indicators
assess the quality of MT institutions, specific to the transition process, and are
computed only for CEE countries. In order to fully explore the information incor-
porated in these measures, we assume that all EU members have well-functioning
market economies, graded 4 according to the EBRD scale. Accordingly, since most
international bodies set Western European economies as the main guideline for
CEE countries’ transition process, we consider CEE institutions to be fully compatible
8 A more detailed discussion of component measures of the EBRD index is presented in Appendix A.
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with the market economy when they reach the same score as the institutions of EU
countries. This adjustment is compatible with observed scores for other institu-
tional variables of the two groups of countries, shown in Table 2. Even though the
other three indices exhibit some variation of scores across EU countries, CEE coun-
tries always obtain lower scores. Moreover, the maximal CEE score never exceeds
the average value of the same indicator for EU members.
The Heritage Foundation measures the quality of institutions in a country by
an Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), published since 1995, for a large number of
countries. IEF is computed as the simple average of ten component indices, corre-
sponding to an equal number of institutional dimensions, and takes values from 5
to 1.9 A score of 1 denotes an institutional framework and a set of policies that are
most propitious to economic freedom. The use of IEF implies a reduction of the
time range of the analysis, but, unlike the case of the EBRD composite index, it is
possible for all countries in the sample. To avoid multicollinearity between institu-
tional and trade liberalization measures, we re-define the IEF index as the average
of its component indices, less trade policy.
The Fraser Institute has developed an index of economic freedom of the world
(EFW), which measures the consistency of a nation’s policies and institutions with
economic freedom. It is published in the institute’s annual report ‘The economic
freedom of the world’ and is currently available for 123 countries. The index measures
the degree of economic freedom present in five major areas: (1) the size of the govern-
ment, expenditures, taxes, and enterprises; (2) the legal structure and the security of
property rights; (3) the access to sound money; (4) the freedom to trade internationally;
and (5) the regulation of credit, labour and business. Unlike the previous measures,
the EFW index is computed only for two out of the eight years of our sample.
9 A more detailed discussion of component measures of IEF is presented in Appendix A.
Table 2. Institutional scores for EU and CEE countries
Variable No. of observations Mean SD Minimum Maximum
IEF for EU 80 0.67 0.08 0.47 0.81
IEF for CEE 55 0.50 0.10 0.28 0.67
Kaufmann for EU 42 0.79 0.07 0.62 0.89
Kaufmann for CEE 30 0.59 0.07 0.46 0.69
Fraser for EU 28 0.71 0.06 0.58 0.82
Fraser for CEE 20 0.52 0.10 0.31 0.68
EBRD for EU 112 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
EBRD for CEE 80 0.59 0.12 0.24 0.83
Note: Scores are re-scaled to take values from 0 to 1.
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Kaufmann et al. (2003) estimate six dimensions of a country’s governance for
four distinct years: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. Their indicators are based on several
hundred variables measuring the perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 sepa-
rate data sources constructed by 31 different organizations. We construct a global
indicator for the quality of a country’s institutions as the simple average of these
six governance indicators.
We re-scale all institutional indicators to take values between 0 and 1, with a
score close to 0 indicating a poor institutional framework, absence of reforms, and
low economic freedom. The four institutional measures are highly correlated with
each other, as shown in Figure 2. Therefore, we use them separately in the estima-
tions. Additional continuous institutional measures, from the World Development
Indicators database, and from the EBRD Transition Report, are used in the paper
to instrument the quality of the institutions, reflected by the four institutional indices
discussed above, and to characterize more accurately various aspects of the
institutional environment.
Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for institutional and trade
policy variables are shown in Tables A1 and A2 of Appendix A.
Figure 2. The correlation of institutional variables
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5. Baseline estimations and results
In the empirical part of this paper, we estimate first the impact of institutions and
trade policy instruments on cross-European trade, using global measures for the
institutions of the countries. Secondly, we test for the presence of a mutual depend-
ency between trade and institutions and use instrumental variables techniques to
correct for endogeneity. Then, we assess the contribution of each factor in promoting
trade, computing the share of cross-border costs it explains, and the supplementary
trade flows it generates. Last, we investigate the different institutional aspects
and employ quantitative institutional variables in order to draw specific policy
recommendations.
We turn now to the estimation of the impact of trade liberalization (the reduc-
tion of tariffs and non-tariff barriers) and of the institutional framework, on trade
between European nations. The first problem we face is finding good measures for
the quality of national institutions. There are multiple measures which evaluate
various institutional aspects. Besides the measures discussed in Section 4, empirical
studies have also employed the Freedom House country ratings, the Euromoney
country risk index, the ICRG risk ratings, the BERI index of contract enforceability,
and others.
Useful insights can be gained by considering the quality and the functioning of
the entire institutional framework of a country. For that, a single overall institu-
tional measure, incorporating different institutional aspects, should be used. This
simplifies the comparison of the importance for trade of national institutions
versus that of foreign trade policy. In order to quantify the quality of national
institutions, we restrict ourselves to the IEF and EBRD indices. For comparability
reasons, however, we also report results obtained using Kaufmann et al. (2003), and
Fraser Institute institutional indices. The Index of Economic Freedom is employed to
picture GD institutions, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
index to show the state and the advancement of MT institutions.
We estimate the demand for foreign products relative to domestic demand
using Equation (14). Since we analyse trade between countries of the same geo-
graphic area, sharing common historical and linguistic backgrounds, we account
for these aspects in estimations:
(17)
where borderij, langij, and countryij are dichotomic variables, corresponding respec-
tively to the existence of a common land border between countries i and j, of
the same language spoken by individuals in both countries, and the fact that i and
j formed a single country in the past. The last two variables in (17) reflect the
nominal and the absolute difference in the quality of institutions of the two
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countries. Note, that (17) resembles the standard gravity equation, suggesting that
similar values and signs of the coefficients should be found.
The results of the estimation of (17), with ordinary least squares and year dum-
mies, and with generalized least squares, appear in Table 3. The different columns
correspond to the four institutional measures employed. Estimates with the
re-scaled Index of Economic Freedom are shown in column 1. The choice of relative
demand as the explained variable introduces spatial autocorrelation in the error
Table 3. Relative demand for foreign products: importing country as reference
Dependent variable: ln mij/mjj 
Model: (1) 
IEF OLS
(2) 
EBRD OLS
(3) 
Kaufmann OLS
(4) 
Fraser OLS
Intercept −2.83*** −2.72*** −2.71*** −2.75***
(0.20) (0.17) (0.22) (0.22)
ln production ratio 0.73*** 0.75*** 0.72*** 0.71***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
ln wage ratio −0.20 −0.27 −0.42 −0.27
(0.16) (0.18) (0.27) (0.25)
ln distance ratio −0.57*** −0.66*** −0.52*** −0.60***
(0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13)
Common border 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.70***
(0.15) (0.11) (0.16) (0.14)
Common language 0.74*** 0.68*** 0.65*** 0.69***
(0.16) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17)
Same country 1.62*** 1.49***
(0.20) (0.14)
ln (1 + tariff/100) −19.38*** −14.27***
(3.19) (3.55)
NTB coverage 0.06 −0.16
(1.04) (0.31)
Institutions, quality 0.18 1.46 1.85 0.46
(1.01) (1.12) (1.40) (1.48)
Institutions, distance −0.53 −1.32** −2.97*** −1.19
(0.85) (0.64) (0.82) (1.59)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
No. of observations 1,073 1,356 546 314
R2 0.723 0.74 0.736 0.702
RMSE 0.802 0.786 0.73 0.772
230 Cheptea
© 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Table 3. (cont) Relative demand for foreign products: importing 
country as reference
Dependent variable: ln mij/mjj
Model: (5)
 IEF GLS
(6) 
EBRD GLS
(7) 
Kaufmann GLS
(8) 
Fraser GLS
Intercept −2.99*** −2.86*** −3.47*** −3.32***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
ln production ratio 0.72*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.73***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ln wage ratio −0.21*** −0.32*** −0.30*** −0.24***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
ln distance ratio −0.55*** −0.67*** −0.66*** −0.62***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Common border 0.75*** 0.72*** 0.98*** 0.87***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Common language 0.65*** 0.68*** 1.04*** 0.96***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09)
Same country 1.53*** 1.56***
(0.36) (0.08)
ln (1 + tariff/100) −19.05*** −14.02***
(0.42) (0.30)
NTB coverage 0.05 −0.43***
(0.07) (0.07)
Institutions, quality 0.19* 1.94*** 1.25*** 0.29***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.15) (0.11)
Institutions, distance −0.68*** −1.43*** −1.21*** −3.23***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
No. of observations 1,073 1,356 546 314
Hausman specification test 4.56 19.51 28.60 5.49
P-value 0.34 0.03 0.00 0.24
Breusch and Pagan test 1,418.91 1,641.38 430.49 90.53
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00
Correlation of 
institutional variables
0.17 0.32 −0.00 0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***, ** and * represent, respectively, statistical significance at the 1, 5
and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
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term, for which we correct through a robust clustering procedure, that allows
residuals for the same importing country to be correlated. All variables have coef-
ficients of the expected sign and most of them are statistically significant. The
coefficient on the production ratio is close to 1, and that of distance is within the
range of values found in the literature. The small and non-significant estimate of
the elasticity of substitution, σ, equal to the coefficient on the wage ratio with
opposite sign, raises doubt about the use of wages as proxies for factory prices.
This problem may be due to the fact that labour is the only considered production
input. Nevertheless, endogeneity may also play a role here: large exports motivate
firms to increase wages; imports boost or check domestic production, depending
on the share of intermediate relative to final products. Positive coefficients for
dummy variables controlling for common land border, for common language, and
for common historical path, show the importance of non-economic factors in
reducing international trade costs. Countries sharing a common land border or
language trade two [= exp(0.74)] times more than countries that do not. The absence
of international borders between two countries, at a certain point in the past,
increases trade by five [= exp(1.64)] times.
The main parameters we are interested in are the coefficients of trade policy,
and institutional variables. The import tariff enters Equation (17) with a large and
strongly significant weight of −19.38. The coefficient on the NTB coverage ratio is
not significantly different from zero. The difference between the coefficients on
tariffs and on wages is much larger than 1, contrary to what is predicted by
the theory. This confirms the limits imposed by the assumption that labour is the
single production factor. The large value of the coefficient on tariffs is due to the
selected countries and years in the sample. The late 1990s were characterized by a
general liberalization of European trade, and by a simultaneous re-orientation of
CEE countries towards West European partners. The coefficients of the two insti-
tutional variables are of expected signs, but are not statistically significant. The
point estimate for the difference in the quality of institutions reflects the effect of
an equal simultaneous improvement of institutions in both countries, while the
coefficient of the second institutional variable shows the discrepancy in the quality
of these institutions. Low statistical significance may be explained by the use of
inappropriate econometric techniques, and by the disregard of the two-way
causality between trade and institutions, described in Section 2.
The negative and significant constant term indicates that there are important
border specific trade costs left unexplained by tariffs, NTB, and the institutional
environment. These additional trade barriers lead firms to trade about 17 [=
exp(2.83)] times more with domestic, than with similar foreign partners.
In column 2 we estimate (17) using the EBRD index. The results are very similar
to the previous ones, and all coefficients have expected signs. In addition, the
coefficient for institutional distance is statistically significant, confirming the fact
that similarity between national institutions generates more trade. To produce
results more comparable to other findings in the literature, we use institutional
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indices developed by Kaufmann et al. (2003) (column 3), and the Fraser Institute
(column 4), measures more frequently found in empirical studies. Compared with
IEF and EBRD index, the Kaufmann and Fraser Institute measures are available for
a smaller number of years. This restriction of the dataset removes all variation in
tariff and non-tariff data, and the common historical path captured by the country
dummy. Hence, one cannot estimate the coefficients for these variables. How-
ever, we find evidence of a positive impact on trade of the quality of institutions
(although not statistically significant), and of their similarity. Point estimates for
institutional variables with all four indices are of comparable magnitude. One can
thus be pretty confident of obtaining credible results when restricting the choice to
the IEF and EBRD index.10
In the second part of Table 3 we display results with panel estimation tech-
niques. Cross-section time-series generalized-least-squares estimates of (17) are
shown in columns 5 to 8. We need to choose between a fixed-effect and a random-
effect estimator. The presence of explanatory variables invariant in time in Equa-
tion (17) makes it impossible to estimate coefficients with a fixed-effects procedure.
However, in order to use random effects we need to test for the independence of
the individual (in our case country-pair) error term, with respect to explanatory
variables. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects is
highly significant for the IEF, the EBRD and the Fraser Institute indices, indicating
that individual effects are not constant across time – a violation of the primary
random-effects assumption. However, the Hausman test of fixed versus random
effects specification indicates that very similar coefficients are obtained with both
models: for all three indices the χ2 statistic is not significant at the 1 per cent level.
In the case of the Kaufmann index, although the difference in coefficients is sys-
tematic (χ 2 = 28.60, P = 0.00), the independence assumption of the individual term
is validated. Therefore, we prefer the random to the fixed effects specification for
all institutional measures. We also control for panel specific heteroscedasticity.
Interestingly, in this case coefficients of both institutional variables become
significant, regardless of the index employed. We find evidence in support of both
institutional channels identified in Section 3: countries trade more when they have
both good and similar institutions. Moreover, the effect is significantly larger when
MT institutions are targeted. Despite the fact that the variance of the level of
economic freedom among European countries is comparable to that of the quality of
market institutions, countries need to concentrate their efforts on the latter, in order
to increase regional trade integration.
Thus, a 1 per cent drop in the average import tariff causes a 14 per cent to 19 per cent
increase in bilateral relative to domestic trade, and a 5 percentage point drop can
persuade firms in the importing country to buy twice as many products from
10 The high correlation of the IEF and EBRD index with the Kaufmann and Fraser Institute indices, shown
in Figure 2, also supports our choice of institutional variables.
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foreign partners. The significant estimated value of the coefficient on NTB in
column 6 permits us to quantify the impact of these measures on trade: 1 per cent less
of trade subject to NTB yields a 54 per cent = [exp((−1) * (−0.43)) − 1] increase in foreign
relative to domestic trade. Similarly, one standard deviation increase in the level
of economic freedom of a foreign partner will lead to a 3.4 per cent = [exp(0.175 *
0.19) − 1] increase in imports from that country compared to domestic trade, and a
comparable reduction of the institutional distance to that country – to a 6.6 per cent
= [exp(0.10 * (−0.68)) − 1] increase of the trade ratio. Meanwhile, one standard deviation
increase in the quality of MT institutions of a partner, and in the MT institutional
distance generate respectively 79 per cent = [exp(0.30 * 1.94) − 1], and 26 per cent =
[exp(0.21 * (−1.43)) − 1] more trade with that particular country compared to internal
trade. Thus, it can be concluded that, despite the large effect of trade liberalization,
institutional reforms remain an important trade-creating factor, and that, European
trade will mostly benefit from improved market institutions of CEE countries.11
When the NTB coverage ratio in Equation (17) is replaced with the NTB fre-
quency ratio, estimated coefficients are almost unchanged, both in terms of magni-
tude and of statistical significance. The coefficients of correlation between the
institutional variables on the right hand side of (17) are indicated in the last line of
Table 3. They are sufficiently low for one to worry about multicollinearity. For a
robustness check, we also estimated Equation (17) with exporter fixed effects to
control for multilateral resistance, and we obtain very similar values for all coeffi-
cients. One does not need to include importer fixed effects in this case because
importer-specific resistance terms simplify when the mij/mjj ratio is the explained
variable. Hence, the choice of the monopolistic competition trade model does not
affect the conclusions formulated in the paper.
We use Equation (16) to estimate the impact of trade policy and of institutions
on foreign trade, with imports from a third country as reference. As before,
dummies for contiguity, common language, and political ties in the past are added
as explanatory variables:
(18)
We choose Germany, the main trading partner of most European countries, as
the reference country k. Hence, the last two variables reflect (i) the difference in the
11 According to the transformation of institutional variables, EU countries already possess well-functioning
MT institutions.
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quality of institutions of the exporting country i and Germany, and (ii) the differ-
ence between the institutional distance separating the country j from i, and from
Germany. Regardless of the complex form of these variables, the interpretation of
their coefficients is the same as for institutional variable in (17). On the other hand,
the economic meaning of the constant term in (18) is quite sophisticated. It repre-
sents the ratio between the border effect of country j with i and its border effect
with Germany.
Coefficients estimated with (18), for each of the four institutional indices, are
shown in Table 4. As predicted by the theory, these values are very similar to those
obtained by estimating (17). However, dividing imports from foreign European
countries by imports of German products has several inconveniences. First, even if
low prices attract foreign customers, they can also signal a poor quality of the
traded goods. Consumers may prefer more expensive German products to cheaper
products of a different origin simply because the difference in price can be com-
pensated for by the higher quality of the German goods. Second, because seven
countries from the sample share a land border with Germany, but only one
shares a common language, and none was part of the same country as Germany,
Equation (18) underestimates the impact of contiguity, and amplifies the effect of
linguistic and historical ties on trade. Finally, trade specification (18) reduces the
variance of the institutional variables, which leads to a drop in the statistical
significance of the estimates.
6. Endogeneity issues
Another issue we want to discuss in detail in this article is the endogeneity in the
estimated trade Equation (17). The presence of a mutual causality, between trade
and the independent variables, can produce biased coefficients in OLS and GLS
estimations. As already stated in Section 5, production and wage variables are one
possible source of endogeneity. In particular, larger imports can favour domestic
production, when the latter relies heavily on foreign intermediate inputs, but can
also have a harmful effect if imported products crowd out local producers through
increased competition on the domestic market. Wages, too, are affected by the
performance of the country in foreign markets. This can be visualized within a
country through the gap between employees’ remuneration by exporting compa-
nies and their remuneration by local market-oriented firms. Last but not least, the
quality of institutions can change with respect to the participation of the country
in international trade. The exchange of large amounts of goods with foreign part-
ners brings the firms more often into contact with deficiencies in the institutional
framework, and can spur them to lobby for reforms in the system.
Consequently, one calls for appropriate econometric procedures when estimating
the relative demand for foreign goods. This problem is usually solved by using
the instrumental variable (IV) and the generalized method of moments (GMM)
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estimations. However, these approaches rely heavily on the availability of good
instruments for each endogenous variable, i.e., for variables that are important
determinants of a particular endogenous variable, but have no direct impact on the
others. The literature acknowledges the difficulty of finding good instruments for
all three variables mentioned above.
Table 4. Relative demand for foreign products: trade with Germany as reference
Dependent variable: ln mij/mkj
Model: (1) 
IEF OLS
(2) 
EBRD OLS
(3) 
Kaufmann OLS
(4) 
Fraser OLS
Intercept 35.12* −2.87 30.04 50.52***
(18.76) (18.41) (19.56) (15.76)
ln production ratio 0.87*** 0.86*** 0.88*** 0.86***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
ln wage ratio 0.22*** 0.47*** 0.14 0.28*
(0.07) (0.09) (0.15) (0.16)
ln distance ratio −0.56*** −0.58*** −0.46*** −0.46***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.11) (0.14)
Common border 0.28** 0.28** 0.28** 0.26**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Common language 0.93*** 0.88*** 0.91*** 0.92***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09)
Same country 3.20*** 2.97***
(0.25) (0.20)
ln ((1 + tariff/100)ratio) −15.14*** −1.85
(4.03) (7.20)
NTB coverage −1.84*** −1.08**
(0.35) (0.46)
Institutions, quality 0.96** 0.88* 2.60*** 2.26***
(0.42) (0.46) (0.65) (0.60)
Institutions, distance 0.16 −0.50 −1.23* −2.77***
(0.53) (0.52) (0.65) (0.54)
No. of observations 1,017 1,306 507 314
R2 0.862 0.868 0.884 0.877
RMSE 0.562 0.558 0.466 0.48
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***, ** and * represent, respectively, statistical significance at the 1, 5
and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
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In econometric terms, what counts is good instruments for the endogenous
variables on the right hand side of (17) in order to find exogenous variations in
production, wages, and institutions, and to explain relative trade. From a theoretical
point of view, truly exogenous variations are unlikely to exist; it is necessary,
therefore, to find sources of variation that are orthogonal to other determinants of
trade. The theoretical model predicts a unitary coefficient on production. Thus, one
can easily correct for endogeneity between trade and production in (17) by impos-
ing β1 = 1. Wages in a country are determined by demand and offer conditions on
the labour market: the size of the labour force, the number of employers (firms)
operating on the market, the bargaining power of the unions, and the productivity of
labour. Of all these variables, only the last one passes the Sargan over-identification
test with our data, and is used to instrument the variation in wage ratio in the
first-stage estimations.
Endogenous institutions have been treated in the literature almost exclusively
in connection with development related issues. For example, Acemoglu, Robinson
and Johnson (2001) demonstrate their strong causality on per capita income. They
use mortality rates of colonial settlers as an instrument for institutional quality, and
find that the adopted instrument is strong. From that paper it is possible to con-
clude that the characteristic of the environment, as found by the colonists, is one
of the most important reasons for their decision to settle in a certain area than in
another. Moving away from the idea that geography can explain the variation of
institutions, Easterly and Levine (2003), and others instrument institutions by using
different geographic variables. They include different sets of instruments for
endowments, such as the latitude, the fact of being (or not) landlocked, and ten
different dummy variables representing minerals and crops.
However, all theses studies adopt an approach specific to the breakdown of the
world into imperial states and their overseas territories. Therefore, the instruments
they propose are irrelevant for institutions of European countries. In our case,
instrumental variables need to account for specific differences between East and
West European economies. None of the countries in our sample has been a former
colony. Purely geographic aspects cannot explain differences in the functioning of
institutions across the continent, either. Although countries from the North tend to
have better institutions, the North–South passage to poorer institutions is far from
being smooth. Moreover, one should be able to provide an economic justification
for the causality between the chosen instruments and the endogenous explanatory
variable.
We have considered an entire set of possible instruments for institutions,
including mortality rate, share of non-tax revenue, patents deposed by residents
and foreigners, share of rural population, market capitalization, percentage of
listed domestic companies, share of traded stocks in the national product and per
capita consumption of the central government. Plausible stories about the effect on
the quality of institutions can be told for all these variables, but only three of them
qualify as good instruments according to the Sargan test.
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The first instrument is the mortality rate. The intuition behind this is that a
higher probability of dying soon diminishes people’s valuation of future benefits,
including those of well-functioning institutions. Therefore, there is less incentive
for institutional reforms in countries with high death rates. Building better institu-
tions is a long-term investment, and in some countries those who make the main
effort may simply not be able to enjoy its future advantages. High mortality has
the same effects as political instability for government officials, who, therefore,
continue to accept bribery and corruption as everyday occurrences.
Market capitalization, expressed as a share of the domestic product, is the sec-
ond instrument employed. It reflects simultaneously the share of listed companies,
and the market value of their stock. A higher level of market capitalization illus-
trates a larger participation of firms on the stock exchange, a higher value of their
assets, or both. All three situations lead to increased needs (and pressure) for
strong institutions. The stock exchange can be viewed as an institution, and its
condition can shed light on the state of the other institutions in the country.
The last eligible instrument for institutions is the government’s tax revenue. It
is generally accepted that the institutions of a country can change significantly only
with sufficient support from the government. Support can come in two forms:
political and financial. The ability of the government to collect taxes determines the
amount of its funds, and as a consequence its capacity to finance institutional
reforms. A severe limitation in funds on which the government can draw to finance
its actions, reduces not only the scale of these actions but also their popularity
among the electorate.
The estimates of (17) compatible with endogeneity are displayed in Table 5. To
control for the panel structure of our data, country-pair effects have been included
in all second-stage estimations. Wu–Hausman and Durbin–Wu–Hausman test
statistics for the endogeneity are constructed, and are provided in the lower part
of the table. The null hypothesis, associated with these tests, recognizes all the
variables on the right hand side of (17) as exogenous. The alternative hypothesis
requires wages and institutions to be endogenous. Because the results of these tests
rely on the instruments selected, the Sargan test for the validity of instruments is
conducted to determine whether the selected instruments are appropriate.
IEF is used in column 1 as a measure of the quality of institutions. Note, that
limited availability of data about the selected instruments reduces the number of
observations and the variance of other exogenous variables. Thus, the very low
variation in import tariffs makes the estimation of β 7 impossible. The gain in statis-
tical significance of the coefficients of institutional variables is very small, but is
zero on wages. The large P-value for both Wu–Hausman (F = 8.67, P = 0.00) and
Durbin–Wu–Hausman (χ2 = 29.99, P = 0.00) tests reveals that controlling for endo-
geneity is unnecessary. The absence of endogeneity also suggests that OLS and
GLS estimations are reliable in this case.
Column 2 shows the results obtained with the EBRD composite institutional
index. Both a large partial R2 in first-stage regressions, and a low Sargan statistic
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Table 5. Relative demand for foreign products: endogeneity issues
Model:
Dependent variable: ln mij/mjj
(1) 
IEF 
IV
(2) 
EBRD 
IV
(3a) 
Kaufmann 
IV
(3b) 
Kaufmann 
GMM
(4a) 
Fraser 
IV
(4b) 
Fraser 
GMM
Intercept −3.58*** −3.03*** −2.33*** −2.31*** −2.37*** −2.28***
(0.41) (0.15) (0.13) (0.26) (0.20) (0.26)
ln production ratio 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ln wage ratio −0.25 −1.03*** −1.44*** −1.43*** −1.35*** −1.23***
(0.22) (0.13) (0.15) (0.30) (0.22) (0.36)
ln distance ratio −0.57*** −1.11*** −0.85*** −0.83*** −0.84*** −0.93***
(0.13) (0.05) (0.07) (0.13) (0.10) (0.17)
Common border −0.39 0.49*** 0.39** 0.38* 0.31*** 0.13
(0.25) (0.09) (0.16) (0.22) (0.26) (0.16)
Common language 2.03*** 0.96*** 0.79*** 0.81*** 0.92*** 1.02***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.23) (0.19) (0.33) (0.19)
Same country 2.45*** 2.62***
(0.20) (0.43)
ln (1 + tariff/100) −8.62***
(1.46)
NTB coverage −0.63 −1.50***
(0.53) (0.16)
Institutions, quality 0.50 4.34*** 3.02*** 2.18 4.34** 2.81
(0.53) (0.73) (0.86) (2.35) (1.80) (4.19)
Institutions, distance −0.39* −0.79*** −2.24*** −2.39*** −1.18 −0.22
(0.22) (0.28) (0.71) (1.15) (1.18) (1.79)
First-stage regressions
Wage: partial R2 0.088 0.765 0.414 0.414 0.536 0.536
Institutions: partial R2 0.169 0.758 0.398 0.398 0.332 0.332
Second-stage regression
Centred R2 0.990 0.950 0.427 0.406 0.382 0.414
RMSE 0.139 0.299 0.898 0.91 0.93 0.91
Sargan test 1.49 0.01 3.42 0.63 4.25 1.25
P-value 0.22 0.91 0.06 0.43 0.04 0.26
Wu–Hausman F-test 0.54 8.67 32.09 8.81
P-value 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00
Durbin–Wu–Hausman χ2 test 1.92 29.99 57.73 17.10
P-value 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pagan–Hall test 396.01 22.73 16.06
P-value 0.29 0.00 0.01
No. of observations 607 867 494 494 288 288
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent, respectively, statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10
per cent levels, respectively.
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(0.01, P = 0.91), testify to the relevance of the chosen instruments. The two endo-
geneity tests justify the use of an instrumental variables estimator. All coefficients
are significant at the 1 per cent level. The coefficient on wage ratio is equal to −1.03,
yielding a more credible value of the elasticity of substitution σ. Compared to OLS
and GLS estimations presented in Table 3, the effect of NTB and the quality of
institutions on cross border trade, obtained with IV, is much larger. The impact of
import tariffs and institutional quality, on the contrary, is lower with a IV estima-
tor. The elimination of tariffs for European trade, which amount at the beginning
of the period to a 5 per cent average, generates according to estimates in column 2,
a 43 per cent = [5 * (−8.62)] increase in trade. Opposed to results obtained with OLS
and GLS estimators, the effect of the quality of institutions on trade is 5.5 times
larger than the effect of the institutional distance separating the countries. Still, in
the case of the EBRD, the two measures are not orthogonal: any improvement in
the functioning of the institutions of CEE countries reduces the institutional dis-
tance separating them from EU members. The results are very similar if the NTB
coverage ratio is substituted by the NTB frequency ratio.
In columns 3a and 3b, the Kaufmann general index is used to construct the two
institutional variables, and in the last two columns we employ the Fraser index.
The χ2 score of the Sargan test (equal to 3.42 with the Kaufmann index, and to 4.25
with the Fraser index) is below the 1 per cent critical value, suggesting that the null
hypothesis, which states that the selected instruments are appropriate, should be
accepted in both cases. The value of the Wu–Hausman test statistic, shown in
Table 5 (32.09, and respectively, 8.81), is well above the 1 per cent critical value of
the χ2 distribution, indicating that wage and institutions in (17) are truly endogenous
variables. IV estimations reveal institutions as stronger determinants of trade.
However, for both Kaufmann and Fraser indices, the IV estimator does not correct
for heteroscedasticity in the first and second stage estimations. This is reflected in
the significant Pagan–Hall statistic, shown at the bottom of Table 5. The generalized
method of moments (GMM) estimator is used to fix this problem. Again, the GMM
equivalent of the Sargan test, also called the J statistic of Hansen, confirms that the
selected instruments are appropriate. Switching to the GMM estimator reduces the
statistical significance of the institutional effects. However, we do not consider
this loss to be important as we base our main conclusions on the IEF and EBRD
index. Results in column 3a, the only one yielding significant estimates for both
institutional variables, show that the reduction of the institutional distance
separating two countries generates about as much trade as an equal upward shift
in the quality of institutions of both countries.
Whenever endogeneity is present, IV and GMM estimates of the wage ratio
coefficient are, in absolute value, larger than 1 complying with the predictions of
the theoretical model. One concludes that wages can be employed as proxies for
factory prices, only if one corrects for the introduced endogeneity. Using either of
the four institutional measures described above yields similar results: international
trade increases when national institutions work better, and are less different. Trade
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liberalization, translated into lower import tariffs and lower shares of trade subject
to NTB, has a strong trade-boosting effect. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the
improvement of institutions is expected to increase trade between European part-
ners, suggesting that trade integration can continue even when complete trade
liberalization is reached.
7. Trade policy vs. institutional reforms
There are two possible ways in which one can make judgements about the relative
importance of trade policy instruments and reforms of national institutions for
regional trade integration. The first method consists in determining the share of the
overall border effect explained by each determinant. The second looks at the vol-
ume of additional bilateral trade generated by complete trade liberalization, or by
fully accomplished institutional reforms. For both approaches, estimates of imports
relative to domestic trade mij/mjj are used.
The overall border effect between two countries i and j reflects the loss in trade
caused by all border-related barriers. I compute this border effect, labelled BE, as
the exponential of the constant term of Equation (15) taken with opposite sign: BE
= exp((σ − 1)Bij). Recall that Equation (15) is obtained from trade specification (14) by
dropping all border-specific trade costs and assumes a uniform effect of the quality of
national institutions on the trade within and across national borders. If institutions are
assumed to matter for cross-border trade alone, in order to estimate the total border-
related costs one should drop the institutional term from (15). In this case, all institu-
tional variables refer to border-specific costs and are captured by the constant term.
As one cannot know all elements determining trade costs, we adopt an indirect
method of finding the share of trade costs corresponding to tariffs and non-tariff
barriers on one side, and to worldwide institutional diversity on the other.12 The
residual border effect, left unexplained by these variables is obtained by introducing
separately trade policy and institutional distance in Equation (15):
(19)
(20)
The amount of border-specific costs, in terms of trade volume explained by
trade liberalization and by institutions is then obtained as the difference between
12 Indeed, important border effects are obtained when we include trade policy and institutional variables:
Tables 3 and 5.
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the overall border effect BE, and the residual border effect estimated by (19) and
by (20). Hence, the share of cross-border trade costs explained by each factor is
computed as follows:
(21)
Estimates of BTL and BIR, using as measures of the quality of institutions the IEF and
EBRD index, are shown for four years of our sample in Table 6. In Table 7 results are
provided for the same years, where we also assume that the quality of institutions
matters for trade across borders, exclusively or to a higher degree than for domestic
trade. The contribution to overall trade costs is calculated according to formulas (21),
and estimates of b0 and c0 are obtained with OLS and year fixed effects. By construc-
tion, results should take values between 0 and 1. This is verified except for IEF in
1995, when the estimate of the coefficient of the 1995 dummy is non-significant.
The first conclusion to be drawn from Tables 6 and 7, is the important trade
integration that marked the region during the 1990s. International trade costs,
expressed as volumes of lost trade, were reduced by more than a half. By the year 2000,
Europeans bought about twice as much from regional foreign partners relative to
domestic partners as they did in 1993. Second, trade policy instruments explain the
largest part of the cross-border trade costs. In the early 1990s, around 60 per cent
Table 6. The relative importance of trade barriers due to tariffs, NTB, 
and institutional heterogeneity
1993 1995 1998 2000
Institutional measure: IEF
Total border effect 45.8 35.2 23.4
Import tariff and NTB coverage 0.62 0.45 0.26
Institutional distance 0.14 0.10 0.08
Institutional measure: EBRD index
Total border effect 55.5 50.8 35.1 24.8
Import tariff and NTB coverage 0.62 0.67 0.52 0.39
Institutional distance 0.31 0.23 0.13 0.06
Note: Figures in italics represent the average European border effect. The other figures show the share of
this border effect explained by each set of variables. The quality of institutions is considered equally
important for both foreign and domestic trade, and cannot be held responsible for a lower level of
international trade relative to internal shipments.
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of these costs were due to import tariffs and NTB. Fourteen per cent of the costs
were generated by having GD institutions of uneven quality, and 32 per cent – by
the discrepancies in the quality of MT institutions. Obviously, there are aspects
captured by both types of institutions. Still, one cannot ignore the greater burden
on trade of the quality gap between the market institutions of different countries.
Finally, observe that the weight of trade policy instruments and of institutional
heterogeneity decreased over time. Summing up individual contributions, we
conclude that tariffs, NTB and institutions together explained almost all of border-
specific trade costs at the beginning of the period, but only about half of these costs
by the year 2000. This indicates the increasing importance of other trade costs.13
Alternatively, the role of the foreign trade policy and domestic institutions in
promoting regional trade can be assessed by comparing the volume of trade cre-
ated by the elimination of tariffs and NTB and the elimination of institutional flaws
respectively. Since both trade liberalization and reforms of domestic institutions
refer first of all to CEE countries in the sample, we focus on the trade of each of
them with its EU partners. The trade creation associated with total trade liberali-
zation between East and West European countries is estimated using Equation (17)
and the results are shown in Table 8. We call trade liberalization complete when
all tariffs and non-tariff barriers are eliminated. Because of the low number of
observations for which NTB data are available, two samples are studied: (i) a small
sample, consisting of observations where both tariff and non-tariff data exist, and
(ii) a large sample, combining all observations for which import tariffs are available.
Similarly, we compute the amount of trade that would be created by institutional
13 When the share of trade policy and institutions in total border-specific costs is estimated from a single
trade equation, only the joint effect of the two factors is obtained. In terms of size, it is slightly superior to
the share of tariffs and of NTB in Table 6, but inferior to the sum of the two shares.
Table 7. The share of trade policy and institutional barriers in total 
cross-border trade costs
1993 1995 1998 2000
Total border effect 57.7 52.6 36.4 25.7
Import tariff and NTB coverage 0.58 0.65 0.50 0.37
IEF score and distance −0.07 0.13 0.16
EBRD score and distance 0.34 0.26 0.16 0.09
Kaufmann score and distance 0.04 0.03
Fraser score and distance 0.16 0.06
Note: Figures show the contribution of trade policy and institutional factors in explaining the European
border effect. The quality of institutions is considered to matter exclusively for foreign trade and is a source
of border effects.
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reforms which increase the quality of the CEE institutions to the average quality
level of the corresponding institutions in the EU countries (as in Table 2). These
results are shown in Table 8 for both GD and MT institutions, where all figures
are expressed as a percentage of actual trade.
Trade creation, associated with each factor separately, and with all of them
jointly, is quite low when smaller sample estimates are employed. However, these
values are very large when estimations are carried out on the larger sample. Thus,
the removal of import tariffs yields between 53 per cent and 77 per cent increase in
actual CEE–EU trade. Additional cross-border trade, due to possible reforms of GD
institutions in CEE countries, is barely noticeable. Meanwhile, the amount of trade
created by reforms of MT institutions is very large and exceeds the positive effect of
trade liberalization. Thus, even after CEE–EU trade has been completely liberalized,
the improvement of market institutions in CEE countries can have a consistent
trade creation effect. It may bring about as much as 54 per cent [= (1 + 135.7/
100)/(1 + 53.3/100) − 1] more CEE–EU trade, if post-trade liberalization flows are
used as a base. Moreover, the data reveal a large amplification effect when the two
reforms are introduced simultaneously. Again, evidence of a large positive role of
reforms in market institutions is found.
8. Distinguishing among institutions
A country’s institutional framework is, however, too diverse and broad to be properly
evaluated by a single variable. Therefore, as a next step, it is useful to differentiate
the various features of the institutional framework, and to identify the ones that
matter the most for cross-border trade flows.
Table 8. The CEE–EU trade creation effect of trade liberalization 
and institutional reforms
Source of trade creation Small Sample Large Sample
IEF EBRD IEF EBRD
Trade liberalization 15.2 16.4 76.7 53.3
Institutional reforms 7.1 4.1 3.9 135.7
Trade liberalization and institutional reforms 23.4 21.2 79.8 261.4
Note: Figures show the increase in CEE–EU trade, represented as a percentage of observed flows, associated
with different economic policies. Trade liberalization means the elimination of existing import tariffs and NTB
in the case of the smaller sample, and the elimination of tariffs alone in the case of the larger sample.
Institutional reforms consist in improving the quality of national institutions in CEE countries to reach the
average level observed across the 15 EU countries.
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Firstly, we consider the institutional dimensions corresponding to each component-
index used in the computation of the Index of Economic Freedom, and of the EBRD
composite measure. The high correlation of individual institutional measures,
shown in Figure 2, and in Tables A3 and A4 of Appendix A, requires that each
index be used separately in trade specification (17).
Table 9 presents the coefficients of the variables we are interested in and the
summary regression statistics for the IEF component indices. The first part of the
table shows the OLS estimates of (17). Values of coefficients, close to those obtained
with the average IEF index, are obtained for import tariffs and NTB, while they are
rarely significantly different from zero for institutional variables. A high inflation
rate (corresponding to a low value of the monetary policy factor) and a large black
market cause the highest trade friction. Statistically non-significant coefficients for
other IEF factors are the result either of the absence of a corresponding effect on
trade or of a high correlation of the variables for institutional quality and institutional
distance. Estimations with a single explanatory institutional variable are presented
in the lower part of Table 9. Unlike before, the Hausman specification test here falls
short of the 5 per cent critical value, justifying the use of the random-effects estimator.
Coefficients in column 3 reflect, in this case, the average effect of variables InstitDifij
and InstitDistij. A positive value, obtained for the fiscal burden of the government,
capital flows and foreign investments, and the black market, suggests a larger effect
of the quality of institutions than of institutional distance. Mutual trade would
increase if any of the countries reduce tax rates, restrictions on foreign ownership,
or the size of black market. Negative estimates of the coefficients, on the contrary,
show the prevalence of the similarity in the quality of institutions. This is the case
for government intervention in the economy, for property rights, and for regula-
tion factors. When these aspects are considered, extra trade occurs only if there is
a joint effort by the two countries. Countries with a poor but similar level of
property rights protection, with a high but similar degree of corruption, and/or with
a similar level of restrictions on the creation of new businesses, exchange more
with each other than with partners characterized by better functioning institutions.
The effect of MT institutions is displayed in Table 10. Coefficients and regres-
sion statistics correspond to the separate introduction of each of the nine factors
used in the computation of the EBRD index in Equation (17). Fixed-effects estima-
tions are preferred in this case: the Hausman test of fixed versus random effects
specifications is always significant at the 10 per cent level and in seven out of nine
cases also at the 5 per cent level. The variation in EBRD indices explains a larger
share of the variation in the dependent variable than the variation of IEF factors,
and also produces coefficient estimates closer to findings in the literature. More-
over, in this case, coefficients of all variables have expected signs and are significant
at the 1 per cent level. A one percentage point fall in the average import tariff pro-
duces a 7 per cent to 11 per cent increase in bilateral trade. The NTB coefficient
is negative and highly significant for all nine EBRD factors. The reduction of those
bilateral trade flows subject to NTB by one percentage point produces a 1 per cent
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Table 9. The role of different institutional dimensions: IEF
Model: OLS with year FE 
Institutional dimension
Tariff NTB 
coverage
Instit’l 
quality
Instit’l 
distance
R2 No. 
obs.
Fiscal burden of government −19.68*** 0.03 0.39 0.39 0.724 1,073
(3.13) (1.07) (0.77) (0.59)
Government intervention −18.81*** 0.04 −0.26 0.23 0.726 1,073
(3.23) (1.07) (0.24) (0.22)
Monetary policy −17.98*** 0.05 0.54*** −0.82*** 0.736 1,073
(3.85) (1.01) (0.25) (0.27)
Capital flows and −19.76*** 0.11 0.26 0.26 0.723 1,073
foreign investment (3.21) (1.07) (0.36) (0.41)
Banking and finance −19.74*** 0.07 −0.09 −0.03 0.723 1,073
(3.36) (1.06) (0.35) (0.33)
Wages and prices −19.58*** 0.06 0.09 −0.01 0.723 1,073
(3.37) (1.06) (0.36) (0.42)
Property rights −19.61*** 0.10 −0.08 −0.07 0.723 1,073
(3.32) (1.04) (0.58) (0.37)
Regulation −19.79*** 0.15 −0.31 0.52 0.726 1,073
(3.33) (1.13) (0.47) (0.42)
Black market −19.49*** 0.09 0.37 −0.68*** 0.733 1,073
(3.24) (1.09) (0.32) (0.25)
Model: GLS Tariff NTB Instit Hausman No.
Institutional dimension coverage test obs.
Fiscal burden of government −19.61*** 0.12 0.23*** 5.14 1,073
(0.30) (0.07) (0.07) (0.162)
Government intervention −19.06*** 0.12 −0.17*** 6.47 1,073
(0.23) (0.11) (0.03) (0.091)
Monetary policy −19.93*** 0.05 0.35*** 0.14 1,073
(0.52) (0.11) (0.04) (0.986)
Capital flow and 
foreign investment
−19.44*** 0.09*** 0.52*** 4.37 1,073
(0.20) (0.04) (0.09) (0.112)
Banking and finance −19.54*** 0.19*** −0.05* 5.03 1,073
(0.21) (0.08) (0.03) (0.170)
Wages and prices −19.43*** 0.10* 0.06 6.73 1,073
(0.24) (0.06) (0.04) (0.081)
Property rights −19.54*** 0.24*** −0.12*** 1.97 1,073
(0.16) (0.07) (0.04) (0.373)
Regulation −18.92*** 0.14*** −0.39*** 4.78 1,073
(0.25) (0.04) (0.04) (0.189)
Black market −19.02*** 0.03 0.27*** 7.49 1,073
(0.37) (0.08) (0.03) (0.058)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***, ** and * represent, respectively, statistical significance at the 1, 5
and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
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rise in trade. European trade integration will benefit both from better performing
and more similar market institutions. This fact is verified by each component of the
EBRD index. Still, the effect is more prominent for increased liberalization of
markets, for privatization, and for strong domestic competition.
Despite the improved knowledge about the role of specific institutions, pro-
vided by results presented in Tables 9 and 10, it is difficult to formulate rigorous
economic policy recommendations on the basis of qualitative (index) variables.
What exactly is the meaning of a re-scaled score of 0.5 of the IEF or EBRD index,
or of any of their component factors? What does a ten point increase in this value
correspond to and how specifically can it be achieved by an economy? Government
officials operate with very precise measures, and a more quantified view of institu-
tions is necessary to satisfy their needs.
In the rest of this section we concentrate on CEE exports to the EU, the trade
flows with the highest growth potential within the region. Conclusions formulated
Table 10. The role of different institutional dimensions: EBRD index
Model: FE 
Institutional dimension
Tariff NTB 
coverage
Instit’l 
quality
Instit’l 
distance
R2 Hausman 
test
No. of 
observations
Price liberalization −10.81*** −1.12*** 2.72*** −1.98*** 0.785 25.073 1,356
(1.33) (0.17) (0.43) (0.30) (0.005)
Foreign exchange and 
trade liberalization
−7.08*** −0.85*** 2.44*** −3.89*** 0.792 28.450 1,356
(1.32) (0.17) (0.97) (0.92) (0.002)
Small-scale  
privatization
−9.47*** −1.27*** 2.11*** −0.96*** 0.788 21.179 1,356
(1.26) (0.20) (0.35) (0.34) (0.020)
Large-scale 
privatization
−8.62*** −0.99*** 2.28*** −1.49*** 0.795 17.119 1,356
(1.51) (0.16) (0.27) (0.29) (0.072)
Enterprise reform −9.49*** −0.97*** 1.28*** −1.14*** 0.785 21.057 1,356
(1.48) (0.17) (0.24) (0.21) (0.021)
Competition policy −11.92*** −1.21*** 2.20*** −0.75*** 0.794 24.506 1,356
(1.36) (0.16) (0.24) (0.17) (0.006)
Infrastructure reform −8.94*** −1.00*** 1.61*** −1.12*** 0.790 19.018 1,356
(1.33) (0.16) (0.24) (0.18) (0.040)
Banking sector −7.85*** −1.10*** 1.84*** −1.37*** 0.793 18.777 1,356
(1.40) (0.16) (0.30) (0.26) (0.043)
Non-banking financial −9.81*** −1.13*** 1.69*** −0.93*** 0.793 17.464 1,356
institutions (1.35) (0.16) (0.22) (0.17) (0.065)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***, ** and * represent, respectively, statistical significance at the 1, 5
and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
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below can serve as guidelines for governments of CEE countries in undertaking
those reforms with the strongest potential positive impact on their export perform-
ance in West European markets.
All results obtained with index measures of the quality of institutions emphasize
the important role of MT institutions in the trade between the selected European
countries. Therefore, we focus below on quantitative variables characterizing this type
of institution. We assume that compared to CEE countries, all EU members have well-
functioning market institutions, and their improvement is ruled out. This restriction
is consistent with the economic policy approach: CEE governments can at most produce
changes in their domestic institutions. Hence, one can ignore the quality of institutions
in EU countries and derive an adequate trade specification for CEE exports to EU:
(22)
A single institutional variable reflecting the quality of market institutions in the
exporting CEE country i, Institi, is included. Institutional distance is dropped
because of collinearity with the variable Institi. Indeed, any change in the function-
ing of institutions in i translates immediately into a corresponding shift in the
institutional distance with respect to any importing EU country j.
Eleven different continuous variables are used to portray CEE’s market institu-
tions, and the estimated coefficients of (22) are presented in the first column of
Table 11. They are highly significant, except the average bribe tax. Average values
of institutional variables across CEE countries are also indicated. The impact of
each aspect of the institutional framework of the CEE countries on their exports
to the EU is computed for one unit and one standard deviation unit change in
institutional variables, and is displayed in the last two columns of Table 11.
The private sector accounts for about 62 per cent of CEE economies. One percentage
point increase of that share will generate a 1.57 per cent growth of CEE exports to
EU. The largest effect is observed for budget subsidies and bribes. One percentage
point change in the share of budgetary subsidies and of firms giving bribes reduces
CEE exports by 2.89 per cent and 2.18 per cent, respectively. Similarly, an increased
number of non-performing loans reduces the exporting performance of the country.
On the contrary, the presence of foreign-owned banks, as well as the increased
competition in the banking sector (associated with its fragmentation), results in
greater access of well-performing exporting firms to funds, and increases the trust
of EU partners in the respect for contract stipulations. Not surprisingly, the private
sector is a leading factor for exports. Its expansion, both in terms of production and
employed labour force, together with increased access to credit for private firms,
are an important precondition for the growth of CEE exports. Another important
determinant is the investment rate in the economy. During the 1990s, it amounted
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to 24 per cent of the CEE domestic product. Raising this figure by one percentage
point will produce a 1.84 per cent growth of exports to the EU.
Hence, a CEE country, eager to increase its exports to the EU market, should
start by reducing budgetary subsidies and corruption, and should privilege the
development of private sector and domestic investment. Banking sector and
monetary policy issues, although important, lead to less important gains.
9. Conclusion
Trade policy and national institutions are two important determinants of cross-border
trade flows. We use a simple monopolistic trade model, with a trade costs structure
that includes tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and institutions, to investigate the role of
these factors. Our model and data show that national institutions, measured both
in terms of quality and similarity, along with instruments of foreign trade policy, have
a strong and significant impact on trade between European countries. This result
is confirmed by the use of both index, and continuous variables, as measures for
the quality of institutions. Still, the magnitude of the effect on trade is smaller for
Table 11. The role of MT institutions for CEE exports to EU
Model: OLS 
Institutional dimension
Instit coeff R2 No. of 
observations
Mean (SD) Effect on trade†
∆ = SD ∆ = l
Private sector in GDP 0.04*** (0.01) 0.826 64 62.13 (11.93) 4.55 1.57
Private sector in 
employment
0.02*** (0.01) 0.777 42 59.83 (13.01) 1.67 0.58
Budgetary subsidies −0.08*** (0.02) 0.805 62 4.15 (4.48) −8.03 −2.89
Investment rate 0.05*** (0.02) 0.806 64 24.28 (6.44) 5.33 1.84
Number of banks 0.01*** (0.01) 0.791 64 36.58 (19.18) 0.64 0.22
Foreign-owned banks 0.03*** (0.01) 0.799 63 13.54 (10.35) 3.29 1.14
Non-performing loans −0.02*** (0.01) 0.832 53 17.88 (13.47) −1.81 −0.64
Domestic credit to 
private sector
0.05*** (0.01) 0.852 63 22.02 (12.68) 5.24 1.81
Broad money M2 0.02*** (0.01) 0.826 64 42.55 (18.05) 2.41 0.84
Firms giving bribes 
frequently (%)
−0.06*** (0.01) 0.826 24 26.48 (11.45) −6.10 −2.18
Average bribe tax 1.07 (1.28) 0.834 24 1.24 (0.35) ns ns
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent, respectively, statistical significance at the 1, 5
and 10 per cent levels; † Effects on trade are percentage changes in relative imports, caused by one unit
increase and one standard deviation increase respectively, in the value of the institutional variable.
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institutions associated with the general development of the economy, and larger
for institutions specific to transition economies. Reverse causality between trade
and institutions is also considered and evidence is found that larger trade volumes
stimulate reforms of the institutional framework. The role of trade liberalization in
promoting regional trade integration is compared to that of institutional reforms
employing two different methods. Both of them compute the part of total border-
specific trade costs explained by each factor and determine the size of the additional
trade created by complete CEE–EU trade liberalization, and by possible reforms of
domestic institutions. The results obtained with the two methods point out the non-
negligible contribution of institutional reforms of regional trade. In addition, both
approaches ascribe the major role to the improvement of market institutions in CEE
countries. A further increase in CEE–EU trade, comparable in size to the that due to
trade liberalization, is possible, even after all policy barriers to trade have been removed.
Data also suggest that regional trade is most sensitive to restrictions on international
trade flow and foreign investment and least to government controls on wages and
prices. Finally, the use of quantitative institutional measures allows us to formulate
specific policy recommendations for increasing CEE exports to the EU market. Corrup-
tion and large budgetary subsidies are the highest impediments to CEE products
reaching EU markets, while the level of concentration in the banking sector, as well
as the participation of the private sector in employment, are of marginal importance.
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Appendix A
Institutional variables
The Index of Economic Freedom computed by the Heritage Foundation consists of ten
institutional measures, evaluating the level of economic freedom in as many different
dimensions. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has elaborated
nine institutional measures to evaluate economic reforms in transition countries.
These are published annually in the Bank’s Transition Report and are listed in Table A1.
According to the Heritage Foundation, among EU countries, the United Kingdom
and Ireland have the most liberalized economies, and Spain and Greece are the least
liberalized. Among CEE countries the Czech Republic and Estonia take the lead,
with Bulgaria and Romania at the bottom of the list. The former two economies
were characterized in 2001 by a level of economic freedom comparable to that of
France. From the point of view of undertaken economic reforms, i.e., EBRD index
score, Hungary shows the best performance, while Romania has the worst score
of the sample. Hence, the well-functioning Czech and Estonian institutions at
the beginning of the 21st century are at least partially due to the inheritance of a
relatively good institutional framework. (Fig. A1)
Figure A1. Evolution of the institutional framework of CEE countries
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Table A1. Description of institutional and trade policy variables
Variable No. of 
observations
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Institutional variables
Index of Economic Freedom 135 0.60 0.12 0.28 0.81
Trade policy 135 0.69 0.20 0.25 1.00
Fiscal burden of government 135 0.17 0.12 0.00 0.63
Government intervention 135 0.62 0.19 0.00 0.88
Monetary policy 135 0.58 0.42 0.00 1.00
Capital flow and foreign investment 135 0.73 0.11 0.25 1.00
Banking and finance 135 0.66 0.20 0.25 1.00
Wages and prices 135 0.66 0.14 0.50 1.00
Property rights 135 0.76 0.21 0.25 1.00
Regulation 135 0.56 0.17 0.25 1.00
Black market 135 0.69 0.28 0.00 1.00
EBRD index 192 0.83 0.22 0.24 1.00
Price liberalization 192 0.84 0.20 0.30 1.00
Foreign exchange and trade liberalization 192 0.97 0.08 0.61 1.00
Small-scale privatization 192 0.94 0.14 0.21 1.00
Large-scale privatization 192 0.85 0.22 0.30 1.00
Enterprise reform 192 0.79 0.26 0.00 1.00
Competition policy 192 0.76 0.30 0.00 1.00
Infrastructure reform 192 0.74 0.34 0.00 1.00
Banking sector 192 0.83 0.23 0.00 1.00
Non-banking financial institutions 192 0.76 0.31 0.00 1.00
Kaufmann index 72 0.71 0.12 0.46 0.89
Fraser index 48 0.63 0.12 0.31 0.82
Trade policy variables
Import tariff 3,126 2.34 3.24 0.00 17.12
NTB coverage 358 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.97
NTB frequency 3,126 2.34 3.24 0.00 17.12
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Table A2. Correlation of institutional and trade policy variables
Variable IEF 
index
EBRD
index
Kaufmann
index
Fraser
index
Import
tariff
NTB 
coverage
NTB 
frequency
IEF index 1.00
EBRD index 0.80 1.00
Kaufmann index 0.87 0.87 1.00
Fraser index 0.88 0.88 0.89 1.00
Import tariff −0.42 −0.57 −0.51 −0.65 1.00
NTB coverage −0.16 −0.09 0.30 1.00
NTB frequency 0.06 −0.08 0.42 0.84 1.00
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Table A3. Correlation of IEF component indices
Variables Trade 
policy
Fiscal 
burden of 
government
Government 
intervention
Monetary 
policy
Capital 
flow and 
foreign 
investment
Banking 
and 
finance
Wages 
and 
prices
Property 
rights
Regulation Black 
market
Trade policy 1.00
Fiscal burden of 
government
−0.16 1.00
Government 
intervention
0.12 0.16 1.00
Monetary policy 0.37 −0.31 0.03 1.00
Capital flow and 
foreign investment
0.36 0.00 0.04 −0.06 1.00
Banking and finance 0.16 −0.04 0.09 0.29 0.25 1.00
Wages and prices 0.24 −0.14 −0.21 0.26 0.38 0.46 1.00
Property rights 0.26 −0.13 0.20 0.74 0.26 0.44 0.35 1.00
Regulation 0.33 0.23 0.22 0.27 0.15 0.49 0.33 0.46 1.00
Black market 0.24 −0.34 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.32 0.25 0.75 0.23 1.00
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Table A4. Correlation of EBRD component indices
Variable Price 
liberali-
zation
Foreign 
exchange 
and trade 
liberali-
zation
Small-
scale 
privati-
zation
Large-
scale 
privati-
zation
Enterprise 
reform
Competition 
policy
Infras-
tructure 
reform
Banking 
sector
Non-
banking 
financial 
institutions
Price liberalization 1.00
Foreign exchange and 
trade liberalization
0.54 1.00
Small-scale privatization 0.54 0.73 1.00
Large-scale privatization 0.82 0.67 0.72 1.00
Enterprise reform 0.94 0.64 0.68 0.89 1.00
Competition policy 0.94 0.65 0.65 0.88 0.96 1.00
Infrastructure reform 0.93 0.67 0.65 0.87 0.94 0.94 1.00
Banking sector 0.93 0.66 0.70 0.87 0.95 0.92 0.95 1.00
Non-banking 
financial institutions
0.93 0.68 0.69 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 1.00
